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**OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

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State Dept. review completed

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1. DENUNCIATION OF PURGED SOVIET LEADERS BECOMES SHARPER

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A rising note of harshness has begun to appear in denunciations of Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov in the press and mass meetings. Some of the charges are assuming an aspect which could provide the basis for criminal proceedings against them. The actions of the purged leaders have been variously described as "criminal" and "traitorous," and the army newspaper

Red Star has reportedly accused them of playing into the hands of "the enemies of the state," and of "undermining the defensibility of our country."

Reports that the ousted trio are under house arrest in Moscow and that a commission has been set up to prepare criminal charges against them are unconfirmed. Although the purged party leaders have been stripped of their government posts since the 3 July announcement, they are still nominally party members. Their retention in the party has been cited in one Moscow broadcast as proof that Stalinist methods have been rejected, and this is a consideration which would tend to restrain the hand of the victorious Khrushchev faction.

On the other hand, the purge victims may still have considerable prestige and some remnants of political support. Short of expulsion from the party or criminal proceedings, a campaign of denunciation and a turnover of party officials at lower levels may not be enough to cancel out such influence.

(See following pages for composition of the new party presidium.)

**COMPOSITION OF THE NEW PRESIDUM
CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE**

Full Members

Other Party and/or Government
Posts

(*denotes government post)

Aristov, Averky B.	Secretary, Central Committee. Member, Central Committee Buro for RSFSR.
Belyayev, Nikolai I.	Secretary, Central Committee. Deputy Chairman, Central Committee Buro for RSFSR.
Brezhnev, Leonid I.	Secretary, Central Committee.
Bulganin, Nikolai I.	*Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers.
Furtseva, Yekaterina A.	Secretary, Central Committee. 1st Secretary, Moscow City Party Committee.
Ignatov, Nikolai G.	Member, Central Committee Buro for RSFSR. 1st Secretary, Gorky Oblast Party Committee.
Khrushchev, Nikita S.	1st Secretary, Central Committee. Chairman, Central Committee Buro for RSFSR.
Kirichenko, Aleksei I.	1st Secretary, Ukrainian Party Central Committee.
Kozlov, Frol R.	Member, Central Committee Buro for RSFSR. 1st Secretary, Leningrad Oblast Party Committee.
Kuusinen, Otto V.	Secretary, Central Committee.
Mikoyan, Anastas I.	*1st Deputy Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers.

Full Members

Other Party and/or Government
Posts

(*denotes government post)

Shvernik, Nikolai M.	Chairman, Party Control Commission.
Suslov, Mikhail A.	Secretary, Central Committee.
Voroshilov, Kliment Ye.	*Chairman, Presidium, Supreme Soviet (titular chief of state).
Zhukov, Georgy K.	*USSR Minister of Defense.

Candidate Members

Kalnberzin, Yan. E.	1st Secretary, Latvian Party Central Committee.
Kirilenko, Andrei P.	Member, Central Committee Buro for RSFSR. 1st Secretary, Sverdlovsk Oblast Party Committee.
Korotchenko, Demyan S.	*Deputy Chairman, Presidium USSR Supreme Soviet. *Chairman, Presidium Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.
Kosygin, Aleksei N.	*1st Deputy Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers.
Mazurov, Kirill T.	1st Secretary, Belorussian Party Cen- tral Committee.
Mukhitdinov, Niritdin A.	1st Secretary, Uzbek Party Central Committee.
Mzhavanadze, Vasily P.	1st Secretary, Georgian Party Central Committee.
Pervukhin, Mikhail G.	*USSR Minister of Medium Machine Building.
Pospelov, Pyotr N.	Secretary, Central Committee.

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2. USSR ORDERS CONCESSION ON COMPULSORY DELIVERY OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS

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Compulsory agricultural deliveries to the state from private plots will be abolished next January under a Soviet decree of 4 July. This concession had been proposed by Khrushchev on 22 May. In the recent central committee resolution ousting Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich, they were charged with opposing this "pressing measure" of vital importance.

This incentive measure is part of the program to overtake the United States in per capita meat, milk and butter production in the next few years--a program which the ousted faction allegedly opposed. The final paragraph of the agricultural decree referred to this program and emphatically stated "there can be no doubt that this task will be fulfilled."


Khrushchev feels that these obligatory deliveries can be eliminated because they now are only a small part of total deliveries to the state, and should be done away with in order to "create a better political atmosphere in the farm areas." Meat deliveries from privately owned livestock, which constituted 23 percent of total meat deliveries to the state in 1952, will fall to only 10 percent in 1957, according to Khrushchev. During the same period, milk deliveries from privately owned cows will have fallen from 31 percent of the total to 7 percent.

Khrushchev presumably feels that this measure will work to increase total output. In his 22 May speech, Khrushchev indicated that the collective farms would make up for the former compulsory deliveries from private plots. Nevertheless, the USSR will be unable to achieve Khrushchev's latest livestock production goals.

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3. CHINESE COMMUNIST RESPONSE TO SOVIET PURGE

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The Chinese Communist Party, in a cable to the Soviet party on 5 July, responded favorably to the purge of the Soviet presidium. Peiping's brief message thanked the Soviet party for

having informed the Chinese, through Ambassador Yudin, of the resolution on the "antiparty group of Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov." The cable expressed Peiping's confidence that the action "will help unite and consolidate" the Soviet party, and concluded with an affirmation of continued Sino-Soviet unity in the common cause.

Peiping has already publicized the full text of the Soviet party's resolution on the purge, and an extended Chinese treatment of it will probably be forthcoming. The purge can in part be plausibly presented by Peiping as Soviet action along lines with which the Chinese have been in agreement and along which they had encouraged Moscow to proceed further. Peiping has agreed with Moscow on the need for correcting Stalin's errors, and in the past year has suggested that it would welcome the removal of remaining exponents of those errors, both in the USSR and in the Satellites.

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4. TOP-LEVEL YUGOSLAVS TO VISIT USSR

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


On 5 July, a spokesman for the Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat confirmed press reports that vice presidents Kardelj and Rankovic would "holiday" soon in the USSR. He said it was a "quite normal assumption" that they would have meetings with Soviet leaders.

Comment

Tito, apparently with foreknowledge of the purge, decided to avail himself of the new situation in the hope of easing the strained relations between Moscow and Belgrade which he has generally attributed to the presence of Stalinists within the Kremlin. Belgrade has maintained that, among the Soviet leaders, Khrushchev is the most sympathetic to its position.

It is unlikely that the Yugoslavs will concede on any of their basic ideological views which have brought them into conflict with the USSR. More likely, they hope that Khrushchev will agree to their validity. The initial official reaction in Belgrade to the purge is that it comes "not as a sensation but as a logical step in present-day development in the USSR and world socialism." Realization of the agreement for rapprochement reached by Tito and Khrushchev in 1955 now is hailed by the Yugoslavs as possible.



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5. US EMBASSY COMMENTS ON REPORTED UNREST IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

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Press reports in London, maintaining that discontent in Czechoslovakia is approaching the rebellious mood in Poland just before the Poznan riots, are greatly exaggerated, in the opinion of the American embassy in Prague. The embassy notes, however, a growing feeling among the population that internal and external pressures will force some evolutionary changes in the Czech regime's Stalinist inflexibility. In addition, anti-Soviet feeling has grown since the USSR's intervention in Hungary last fall.

Since last October, the Czech regime has been concerned over liberal tendencies and has adopted various policies and measures designed to curb revisionist expressions. The embassy does not believe the antiliberal speeches at the recent central committee plenum reveal "extreme" nervousness over internal disaffection as some reports have stated, since the regime has reacted similarly before. On the other hand, the new purges in Moscow will undoubtedly encourage liberal elements.

The embassy believes, nevertheless, that the catalytic conditions necessary to transform active disaffection into rebellious temper do not presently exist. In particular, Czech economic conditions are better than those in Poland, and the considerable and continuing press debate between conservative and liberal elements which has been noted in Poland and elsewhere has not been observed in Czechoslovakia. On the contrary, Czech intellectuals have reacted in a dispirited way to stern regime warnings against revisionism.

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